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Decision-making in uncertain environments poses a conflict between the goals of 
exploiting past knowledge in order to maximize rewards and exploring less-known 
options in order to gather information. The descriptive modeling framework utilized in 
previous studies of exploratory choice behavior characterizes exploration as the result of 
a noisy decision process, rather than a process reflecting beliefs and/or uncertainty about 
the environment. It stands to reason that people do not merely negotiate the exploration-
exploitation dilemma by stochastically making choices, but rather, fully utilize their 
knowledge of the environment structure and integrate their trial-by-trial observations of 
choice in order to direct exploratory choice. The work presented in this dissertation 
evaluates this hypothesis. As the previous used tasks structures and descriptive models 
obfuscate this more sophisticated form of belief-directed exploration, I describe a novel 
exploration-exploitation task that affords disentanglement of reflective belief-directed 
exploration strategy from a reflexive and naïve exploration strategy. The former strategy 
is distinguished from latter by its ability to update its belief states in the absence of direct 
observations of choice payoff changes. Accordingly, we specify cognitive models 
 vi 
instantiating these two choice strategies and in the first experiment, we find evidence that 
behavior is by and large better characterized by a reflective strategy, and further, that 
choice latencies appear to index value computations carried out in implementing such a 
strategy. In a second experiment, I reveal how physiological arousal (measured by Skin 
Conductance Responses) appears to index a form of value computation similar to what is 
prescribed this reflective model, and further, how individual differences in physiological 
response to these value signals bear on choice behavior. In a third experiment, I 
demonstrate how this sophisticated form of choice behavior carries cognitive costs, and 
following the contemporary model-based/model-free reinforcement learning framework, 
I show how placing concurrent decision-makers under cognitive load diminishes the 
contribution of the more sophisticated reflective exploration strategy, fostering reliance 
on stochastic, reflexive form of exploratory choice behavior. 
 vii 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
Consider the familiar decision of choosing where to eat when you dine out among 
a set of restaurants you have visited before. Further, assume that the utility of the 
restaurants changes randomly over time due to changes in ownership and staff.  Do you 
choose the known best restaurant based on your experience, or do you visit a restaurant 
that is not the best in your experience but may have become better than the known best 
restaurant? The former could be called exploiting one’s knowledge of the option’s values 
in order to maximize rewards, while the latter involves exploring less-known options in 
order to gather information about which restaurant is currently the best (Sutton & Barto, 
1998). In the face of a long series of meals out, it is not immediately clear what course of 
action a diner should take: optimal action in even this simple example involves a delicate 
trade-off between exploration and exploitation (cf. Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007; Lee, 
Zhang, Munro, & Steyvers, 2009).  
Indeed, balancing exploration exploitation is a non-trivial problem, and has been 
of interest to artificial intelligence and neural Reinforcement Learning (RL) research 
communities alike (Badre, Doll, Long, & Frank, 2012; Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, 
Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Humphries, Khamassi, & Gurney, 2012; Jepma & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Dayan & Sejnowski, 1996; Sutton, 1990). In the example dining 
problem, there are adverse consequences for failing to balance the conflicting demands of 
exploration and exploitation: if the diner only exploits his knowledge of the best 
restaurant, he or she will fail to notice when a restaurant known to be inferior in the past 
actually surpasses the known-to-be-best restaurant in quality. At the same time, the diner 
incurs large opportunity costs by exploring inferior restaurants too frequently—that is, 
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constant exploration entails the risk of many low-quality dining experiences. This simple 
example is analogous to many real-world problems faced by decision-makers: one wants 
to make a sequence of choices that maximize overall payoff, but one can only learn about 
the value of an option by choosing it. In this proposal, we consider how decision-makers’ 
evolving beliefs about the decision environment inform the balance of exploration and 
exploitation. 
A commonly used laboratory task to study exploratory behavior is known as the 
n-armed bandit problem. In this task, there are multiple options (i.e., bandits) with 
unknown monetary payoffs associated with them. When the payoffs of options are 
consistently changing over time, the decision-maker must choose between selecting the 
option with the best known payoff (i.e., exploiting), or sampling other options in order to 
learn more about the payoffs of the other options (i.e., exploring). Previous investigations 
of exploratory choice behavior in bandit typically model exploratory choice behavior as 
randomness or noise in participants’ choices (e.g., Daw et al., 2006; Jepma & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Worthy, Maddox, & Markman, 2007). That is, the descriptive 
modeling framework assumed by theses studies does not ascribe exploratory decision-
making to participants’ internal about the task environment, but rather, a stochastic 
process by which sometimes the option of the greatest-known value is chosen and 
sometimes an option of lesser-known value is chosen.  
Of course, it would be unreasonable to assume that the diner in the example above 
makes choices only on the basis of direct experience, using randomness as his only 
source of exploration. In the contemporary RL framework, this type of choice strategy 
would be considered “reflexive” as it can only act based on observing the outcomes 
resulting from actions (cf. Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Dayan, 2009).  Rather, his decision 
to choose the best-known restaurant at any known time point should depend upon factors 
 3 
such as how recently he has sampled the other known-to-be inferior restaurants (i.e., how 
recently he has explored) and his knowledge about how frequently the restaurants change 
in quality over time (i.e., the environment volatility). In other words, it is intuitive that his 
choices to explore versus exploit should be informed by evolving beliefs that take into 
account not only direct experience but knowledge of the restaurant environment’s 
structure. Such a characterization of behavior would be couched in contemporary RL 
terms as “reflective” (Daw et al., 2005) in contrast to the reflexive form of behavior 
described above.  
In this document, I examine how people update—and act upon—their beliefs 
about the relative superiority of exploratory versus exploitative action in a laboratory task 
whose structure mimics the dining example discussed above. Indeed, the idea that human 
decision-makers exhibit structured patterns of exploration in simple choice tasks has 
found empirical support in the literature, but lacks a characterization of beliefs or task 
representations giving rise to these structured patterns (Otto, Markman, Gureckis, & 
Love, 2010). To further evaluate this notion, I describe a novel laboratory bandit task 
whose structure affords a number of psychologically interesting characteristics. First, we 
sought a task structure that would afford unambiguous identification of exploratory 
versus exploitative choices made by the decision-maker. Second, we sought a task 
structure that would allow us to identify the differential contributions of reflective and 
belief-directed exploration strategy versus a reflexive and undirected exploration strategy. 
Third, and perhaps most notably, we sought a task design that would afford trial-by-trial 
inference of decision-makers’ beliefs about the currently optimal action using an optimal, 
reflective model of choice we term the Ideal Actor. Our novel task paradigm and the 
modeling approach used to characterize human behavior in the task are described in 
detail in Chapter 2 of this document. 
 4 
With this behavioral paradigm and modeling approach firmly established, this 
document seeks to answer the following questions: First, does human choice bear the 
influence of a principled, reflective, belief-driven process or is choice merely the result of 
a naïve and reflexive process whose sole source of exploration is stochasticity? Second, 
assuming that behavior is to some extent well characterized by a reflective and belief-
directed exploratory choice regime, do psychometric variables such as choice latencies 
appear to register decision-makers’ beliefs about the currently optimal action? Such a 
demonstration would highlight the utility of our model-based analysis for online analysis 
of exploratory choice behavior. Chapter 3 presents an experiment and detailed behavioral 
analyses that provide insight into both of these questions. Third, we ask whether we can 
utilize reflective models of choice to better understand arousal signals accompanying 
choices in our exploration/exploitation task? It is well documented that autonomic 
arousal—as indexed by skin conductance responses (SCRs)—accompanies actions that 
carry risk of monetary or cognitive costs (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997; Botvinick & Rosen, 
2009), but little work has systematically investigated how quantitative uncertainty relates 
to pre- and post-choice indices of autonomic arousal. With a model-based 
characterization of anticipatory autonomic arousal, the work described in Chapter 4 
affords an initial understanding of these autonomic signals in the guidance of choice. 
Last, Chapter 5 examines the hypothesized cognitive costs of implementing a reflective 
exploration strategy by revealing how concurrent cognitive demands revert decision-
makers to a putatively inexpensive reflexive exploration strategy. Taken together, these 
studies provide a richer picture of belief-based exploratory choice in humans. 
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Chapter 2: A Novel Task and Models of Exploratory Choice  
This chapter details the behavioral paradigm and models used throughout the 
experiments presented here. First, I lay out the a detailed description of the novel choice 
task used in this studies, motivating its critical features in light of previous work 
examining exploratory choice. This is followed by an overview of the reflective and 
reflexive models used here. Then, I describe the proposed work using utilizing these task 
and models. With these tools firmly established, the next chapter presents the results of a 
behavioral experiment that lend credibility to the idea that participants make use of 
beliefs about the environment in order to direct their exploration.  
THE LEAPFROG TASK 
Previous studies of exploratory choice in humans typically utilized n-armed 
bandit tasks in which the payoffs associated with the options noisily drift over the course 
of the decision-making (e.g., Daw et al., 2006; Howard-Jones, Bogacz, Yoo, Leonards, & 
Demetriou, 2010; Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011). Crucially, the payoffs are not explicitly 
made known to participants, which requires them to learn and constantly update their 
knowledge of the payoffs. In these tasks, participants repeatedly choose amongst the 
options, balancing the demands of exploration and exploitation, in order to maximize 
their overall returns. The manner in which the payoffs change—the magnitudes and 
directions of their movement over the course of the experiment—are minimally 
constrained, and thus, at any particular choice point, the decision-maker has no 
reasonable way of estimating the future payoff differences between the options. At any 
one choice point, if the decision-maker knows which option is currently superior, there is 
little constraining their belief about the possible future superiority of the other option. 
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Moreover, the decision-maker cannot reasonably estimate what the long-term future 
utility of exploring other options is.  
The payoff structure of this class of bandit task limits the applicability of belief-
based models of choice, and instead, a different approach is taken to describe 
participants’ choices. The descriptive modeling utilized in these studies, following the RL 
framework (cf. Sutton & Barto, 1998), assumes that decision-makers incrementally learn 
expected values of the options over time, and at each choice point, stochastically decide 
whether or not the highest-valued option is chosen. And while an optimal process for 
tracking mean payoffs is specified for bandits noisily drifting through time, the optimal 
pattern of exploratory versus exploitative choice is not clearly defined for the these tasks. 
Here, I present a novel choice task in which the movement of bandits over time is far 
more constrained, which allows simplification of our assumptions about how human 
decision-makers make updates to payoff expectancies. The simplicity of the present task 
allows for inference about participants’ beliefs—with respect to the optimality of each 
action given a previous history of choices and outcomes—at any given time point. 
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Figure 1: Example payoff schedule for two-armed bandit problem. Red and Green 
lines depict payoffs for choice A and Choice B respectively, as a function of 
trial number. 
An example instantiation of our novel task is depicted in Figure 1. In this task 
structure—hidden to the decision-maker—there are two options, A and B, which pay 10 
and 20 points respectively. Thus, B is the superior option at the beginning of the task. 
Each trial, with a fixed level of volatility, which we call P(flip), the inferior option 
increases in value by 20 points. After the first “jump,” Option A pays 30 points, superior 
to Option B’s 20 points. After this jump, Option B’s payoff will increase by 20 points 
with the same probability P(flip). Thus, payoff jumps are subject to three constraints: 
they occur at a fixed rate P(flip) unknown to the decision-maker, the two options must 
alternate in making jumps, and a jump always increases an option’s value by 20 points. 
The rules governing the payoff changes of the two options, Payoff(A) and Payoff(B), are 
stated more formally below: 
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It is important to note that the payoff jumps locations are not explicitly made 
known to the decision-maker, but rather, must be inferred indirectly from observing the 
resultant payoffs of choices.  
In this task structure, we expect decision-makers’ choices to follow an intuitive 
pattern. This pattern of choice can be seen in Figure 2, which depicts the time course of 
fifty choices of a pilot participant, where the payoffs of the options over time are plotted 
in the same way as in Figure 1 (in this figure, choices to options are denoted by X’s). 
After initial sampling to determine the superior option, the decision-maker primarily 
exploits the known-to-be-superior option, and by sporadically sampling the known-to-be 
inferior option in, the decision-maker will be able to ascertain when a payoff jump has 
occurred. When it has been observed that the inferior option has indeed jumped and has 
become the superior option, the decision-maker then shifts to primarily exploiting the 
now-superior option and sampling the now-inferior option to monitor for the occurrence 
of payoff jumps. Of course, it possible that, with an insufficient level of exploratory 
choice, the decision-maker will miss a jump entirely and observe that the known-to-be-
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superior option itself jumps (i.e., a “double jump”), in which case they should persist with 
the option .  
 
 
Figure 2: Example subject’s time course of choices, plotted in the same manner as in 
Figure 1. X’s denote choices made to the two options. Blue arrowheads 
point downwards to trials classified as exploratory trials. 
 
Optimal choice behavior in this bandit task—and the diner’s situation in the 
example explained above—requires carefully balancing one’s level exploratory and 
exploitative choices. On the one hand, if the decision-maker explore too infrequently, 
they will miss payoff jumps and persist with choosing options that have become inferior, 
missing the greater payoffs associated with the foregone option. On the other hand, 
exploratory choice characteristically entails opportunity costs, and if the decision-maker 
explores the known-to-be-inferior option too frequently, they will repeatedly forego the 
higher payoffs associated with the known-to-be-superior option. It is also worth nothing 
that, this task, the value of information gained by exploring diminishes as the decision-
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maker approaches the terminal choice.  To see this, consider the value of exploring on the 
final trial experiment: it would be wasteful to sample the known-to-be-inferior option, as 
the knowledge potentially gained from sampling is of no use after the final trial.  
It is important to note that this task structure allows for unambiguous 
identification of exploration versus exploitation trials. Typically, classifying choices 
simply involves estimation—based on a decision-maker’s experience up to a given 
trial—the participant’s estimate of the value associated with each option (cf. Otto, 
Markman, Gureckis, & Love). Trials during which the option with the largest—based on 
a participant’s learned values up to that trial— estimated value was chosen are considered 
exploitative whereas trials in which an inferior option is chosen are considered 
exploratory (this analysis is also detailed below in the results of the Pilot Experiment 1). 
In the example sequence of choices in Figure 2, exploratory trials are denoted with blue 
arrowheads. Thus, classification of trials hinges upon the procedure used to infer 
participants’ estimated values of the options. Typically, research utilizing random 
diffusion processes assumes that decision-makers understand that bandit values all drift 
towards a specified midpoint over the course of the experiment (e.g., Daw et al. 2006; 
Howard-Jones et al., 2010; Jepma & Niewenhuis, 2011), mimicking the true environment 
payoff structure.  In the present task structure, identification of trial types using does not 
require assumptions about participants’ knowledge of complex payoff dynamics. Because 
the payoffs of each bandit only increase over time, we can define exploitative choices as 
those made towards the option with the highest-seen payoffs over the course of the entire 
experiment. Exploratory choices, accordingly, are those made towards the other option. 
Further, the payoff of the options relative to each other remain constant (10 points) and 
are deterministic, which removes the influence of noise on updating estimated payoffs of 
options—which will be crucial for specifying the Ideal Actor. 
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Note that, under this structure, payoffs only increase in value for both options 
over the course of the experiment. For example, in Figure 1, the payoffs are 10 and 20 for 
the first few trials, but in the last few trials, difference between the payoffs remains the 
same but the payoff magnitudes are 330 and 340. If these payoff values were tied to 
actual monetary amounts, one might expect that decision-makers will exhibit diminishing 
sensitivity to payoff differences as the payoff magnitudes rise (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992), resulting in increasing indifference towards choice values as the magnitudes rise 
over time. To address this potential concern, participants were rewarded in proportion to 
the number of “correct” choices—choices made to the superior option at the time—made 
over the course of the experiment. Thus, decision-makers’ choices should only reflect the 
difference in payoffs between the options, which does not change over the course of the 
experiment. 
MODELS OF CHOICE IN THE LEAPFROG TASK 
The models we subsequently describe and evaluate can be distinguished by 
whether they are reflexive versus reflective models of choice. One view assumes that 
reflective belief updates incorporate predictions of unobserved changes in environment. 
For example, a reflective belief-updater would be more likely to believe that an inferior 
restaurant has improved as time passes since its last visit to the restaurant. In contrast, a 
reflexive model of choice is only informed by direct observations of rewards and, 
therefore, does not fully utilize environmental structure to update beliefs and guide 
actions. This distinction closely echoes contemporary dual-system frameworks of 
reinforcement learning in which a reflexive, computationally parsimonious model-free 
controller putatively competes for control of behavior with a reflective and model-based 
controller (Daw et al., 2005). We compare human data from the Leapfrog task to three 
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models: a reflexive and myopic model we term the “Naïve RL” model, which expects 
payoffs (or rewards) to be as they were last experienced, a reflective model that plans 
optimally from reflective beliefs, termed the “Ideal Actor”. Formal descriptions of these 
models are given below. 
Naïve RL Model: A Reflexive Model of Choice 
The Naïve RL model is a single-parameter reflexive model (e.g., Otto et al., 2010; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998, Worthy et al., 2007) that assumes that action values are updated in 
a reactive fashion to directly experienced rewards. Indeed its formulation of exploitative 
and exploratory choice closely echo the trial classification scheme described above. This 
model reflexively maintains beliefs about payoffs based only on what it has seen. In other 
words, it believes the point payoffs for each action are those most recently observed. 
Accordingly, the Naïve RL model assumes that Action H (that with highest reward 
observed) and ¬H  (the alterative action with inferior observed rewards respectively give 
rewards of 1 and 0.  Its most recent observation of each action’s reward, Q(H) and 
Q(¬H), are inputted into a softmax action selector, giving it a constant probability of 
exploring or exploiting:  
 
where γ is an inverse temperature parameter. As γ increases, the probability that 
H (the highest-observed action) will be chosen increases and consequently the model 
explores less frequently. This model is algorithmically equivalent to the softmax models 
used by Worthy et al. (2007) and Otto et al. (2010). The crucial feature of its predicted 
behavior—in the leapfrog task—is a constant probability of making an exploratory 
choice. This, and the contrasting predictions of the reflective model, which we term the 
Ideal Actor, is illustrated below. 
! 
P(H) = exp( "# Q(H)  ) /[ exp( "# Q(H)  ) + exp( "# Q(¬H)  )  ]
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The Ideal Actor: An Optimal, Reflective Model of Choice 
The Ideal Actor posit a solution to the following problem:  given access to the 
same information as human decision-makers, how should decision-makers optimally 
form and update their beliefs about the values of the options over time? The Ideal Actor, 
because it leverages knowledge of the structure of the environment in updating its beliefs 
without direct observation of payoff changes, is thus considered a reflective model. 
Indeed, an approach of using a statistically optimal model to gain insight into human 
behavior has been taken in a number of other task domain such as visual search (e.g., 
Najemnik & Geisler, 2005), prediction and changepoint detection in information 
sequences (e.g., Steyvers & Brown, 2005), movement planning (e.g., Trommershäuser, 
Maloney, & Landy, 2008), and prediction of unobserved feature values in artificial 
categories (e.g., Anderson, 1990).  
 
Figure 3: The Ideal Observer / Actor Framework.  
The Ideal Actor framework is illustrated in Figure 3. In essence, after an action is 
made (i.e., one of the two options is chosen), the component we term the “Ideal 
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Observer” integrates updates its belief state about the optimal action based on outcome 
from that choice. The Ideal Actor utilizes the belief state in order to make the value-
maximizing choice at the next time point. The observed payoff resulting from this action 
is then used by the Ideal Observer on the next trial. As illustrated in the diagram, the 
Ideal Observer’s belief update requires as input a current estimate of the environment 
volatility which can actually be fit from participants’ patterns of choice. The Ideal 
Observer, which acts as the belief-updating algorithm, exploits the Hidden Markov 
structure (Rabiner & Juang, 1986) of the leapfrog task. That is, when an action is taken 
and an outcome is observed, the new—and optimal—belief state depends only on the 
previous belief state and the most recently observed outcome. Were optimal belief 
updates to depend on the full history of outcomes and beliefs, the problem would fail to 
satisfy the Markov property. Positing the belief updating procedure as a hidden Markov 
model allows the Ideal Observer to dispense with the full history of belief states and 
outcomes, which, in addition to ensuring computational tractability, offers more 
psychological plausibility than a solution relying representing one’s complete history of 
actions and observations.  
At each choice point, the Ideal Actor faces the challenge of converting its 
statistically optimal beliefs into actions. Fortunately, the Artificial Intelligence literature 
describes a framework for acting optimally when faced with this class of problems, 
formally called Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDPs: Kaelbling, 
Littman, & Casssandra, 1996).  These methods provide the agent with an optimal 
policy—that is, a mapping of the optimal actions for each belief state at a given time 
step—provided the belief formation procedure itself is also statistically optimal. The 
decision problem is also made difficult by the finite number of choices made in this task 
environment: as the agent nears the final choice of the task, the utility of sampling the 
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lesser-valued option decreases. Fortunately, the POMDP-solving approach prescribed by 
Kaelbling and colleagues (1996) incorporates the finite time horizon of the decision 
problem. 
A full algorithmic description of the model is given in the subsequent section of 
this chapter. Here, we qualitatively examine the model’s predicted behavior. The pattern 
of choices predicted by example run of the Ideal Actor is depicted in Figure 4. The top 
panel depicts the model’s choices in the same way as in Figure 2. Note that the Ideal 
Actor predicts a fairly stereotyped pattern of response: exploit for some fixed number of 
trials, and then explore—continuing until a flip is observed, reversing the identities of the 
exploitative/exploratory actions, and resuming.  The middle panel depicts the Ideal 
Observer’s belief, at each trial, that exploiting will yield the higher immediate payoff. It 
is intuitive that this quantity decays as the model makes progressively longer streaks of 
exploitative choices. Indeed, this intuition yields our qualitative metric of belief-directed 
exploratory choice used in the three following experiments. Finally, the bottom panel 
depicts the Ideal Actor’s calculated relative value of the exploitative action (expressed as 
Q(exploit) – Q(explore) ) as a function of its belief. Intuitively, the deterministic version 
of the Ideal Actor makes an exploitative action whenever this quantity is greater than 
zero. It can be seen that this relative value function is monotonically, but non-linearly 
related to the belief state depicted in the middle panel.  
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Figure 4: The top panel depicts an example participant’s sequence of choices and 
payoff observations are depicted with X’s and O’s. Choices considered 
exploratory are marked with blue arrows. The middle panel depicts the Ideal 
Observer's belief that the exploitative options will yield larger the higher 
payoff—and thus the higher immediate reward—at each trial in the task 
instantiation at top. Note that the subject’s certainty about the options’ 
relative payoffs generally decreases during exploitation-only runs. At 
bottom, we show the relative long-term value of the Exploitative option at 
each trial as determined by the Ideal Actor, using the beliefs from the 
middle panel and an optimal valuation function. Also note that changes in 
the relative value follow changes in belief in a non-linear fashion. 
 17 
It is important to note that the Ideal Actor framework provides a different 
conceptualization of exploitative and exploratory trials than the simple RL-based trial 
classification scheme used in previous studies of exploratory choice (e.g., Daw et al., 
2006; Otto et al., 2010). Recall that the Ideal Observer/Actor prescribes choices that 
maximize future returns. While these choices sometimes involve selecting the option with 
payoffs that have been observed to be inferior (considered exploratory choices in the 
analyses reported here) and sometimes involve selecting the option with payoffs observed 
to be superior (conversely, considered exploitative), the Ideal Actor does not explicitly 
make this distinction—rather, it makes choices that appear to be exploratory because it 
believes that option, at that time, may have higher expected returns. To provide a 
description of the pattern of exploratory choice exhibited by the Ideal Actor I propose to 
apply the simple choice classification scheme—described in greater detail in the results 
of Experiment 1— to its prescribed sequence of choices. 
Formal Model Description 
We now describe the belief update in full. Recall that the true, current highest-
payoff option switches over time as the payoffs “flip,” and because these jumps are not 
necessarily observable. The Ideal Actor model maintains a distribution of possible 
underlying states, represented as a belief B, the probability that the exploitative action 
(the action with the currently highest seen payoffs) yields the larger immediate payoff.  
Recall that the true, current highest-payoff option switches over time as the 
payoffs “flip,” and because these jumps are not necessarily observable. The Ideal Actor 
model maintains a distribution of possible underlying states, represented as a belief B, the 
probability that the exploitative action (the action with the currently highest seen payoffs) 
yields the larger immediate payoff.  
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In this formulation B can also be thought of as the number of unobserved (i.e., 
true) flips at a given time point. Accordingly, if there are 0 or 2 unobserved flips at the 
time of choice, the exploitative action yields the higher immediate payoff. Conversely if 
there is 1 unobserved flip at the time of choice then the exploratory (i.e., choice of the 
option with lower observed payoffs) should yield the higher immediate payoff. In the 
model, these belief state updates are contingent on the previous belief state Bt, the action 
taken at time t (exploratory versus exploitative), the observed number of payoff jumps 
seen as a result of that action o (which can take on the values of 0 and 1 jumps in the case 
of exploratory choices and 0 and 2 jumps in the case of exploitative choices), and the 
assumed volatility rate of the environment (P(flip), a free parameter).  
The state transition matrix on exploitative choices is defined by: 
 
                          Unobserved  flips at time t+1 
 0 1 2 
0 
€ 
Bt × 1− P( flip)( )
       if  o=1 or o=2
0      otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
 
 
€ 
Bt × P( flip)
       if  o=0
0    otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
 
 
 
   0 
 
 
 
 
Unobserved 
flips at time t 
1  
0 
 
 
€ 
1− Bt( ) × 1− P( flip)( )
       if  o=0
0      otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
 
€ 
1− Bt( ) × P( flip)
       if  o=2
0      otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
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The state transition matrix on exploratory choices is defined by: 
 
                          Unobserved  flips at time t+1 
 0 1 2 
0 
€ 
Bt × 1− P( flip)( )
       if  o=1
0   otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
 
€ 
Bt × P( flip)
       if  o=1
0      otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
 
 
 
   0 
 
 
 
 
Unobserved 
flips at time t 1  
0 
 
€ 
1− Bt( ) × 1− P( flip)( )
       if  o=1
0      otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
 
€ 
1− Bt( ) × P( flip)
       if  o=1
0      otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
 
 
These individual state transition probabilities are then combined and normalized 
to form a posterior belief.  
 
 
€ 
Bt+1 =
P(s0,t+1,s0,t ) + P(s2,t+1,s1,t )
P(s0,t+1,s0,t ) + P(s2,t+1,s1,t ) + P(s1,t+1,s1,t ) + P(s1,t+1,s0,t )  
 
Note that above, the state si,t+1 refers to the number of unobserved jumps after the 
choice and payoff observation were made while si,t+1 refers to the number of unobserved 
jumps before the choice. 
If the choice was exploratory and a flip is observed, it is intuitive that the 
subsequent identities of the exploratory and exploitative action should swap. The change 
of reference point necessitated by this situation is accomplished by inverting the belief: 
  
€ 
Bt+1 =
(1− Bt+1)  if at = explore and o =1
Bt +1 otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩  
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Using these optimally maintained beliefs, the Ideal Actor employs another step 
that optimally converts beliefs into choice values (Q-values). To do this, we employed 
Cassandra et al.’s (1997) incremental pruning algorithm, an exact inference method that 
calculates action-value functions (i.e., Q-values) for each possible belief state at each 
time horizon (i.e., number of choices remaining). These routines are implemented in 
Cassandra et al.’s POMDP-Solve library (Cassandra et al., 1997). 
The true Ideal Actor deterministically (i.e., greedily) chooses argmaxa Qt(bt, a). 
However, for the purpose of fitting this model to participants’ choices, we utilized a 
softmax choice rule (identical to that used by the Naïve RL model) to generate response 
probabilities from these Q-values: 
€ 
P(ai,t) =
exp[γ ⋅Q(ai,t)]
exp[γ ⋅Q(a j ,t)]j=1
2
∑  
where γ is an inverse temperature parameter governing the choice rule’s 
sensitivity to value differences. As in the Naïve RL model, as γ approaches infinity, the 
Ideal Actor becomes deterministic (greedy) in its choices.  
 
SIMULATION AND FITTING OF MODELS 
Because people may act noisily in their application of calculated choice values, in 
all three models we make choice a stochastic function of action values using the Softmax 
choice rule (Sutton & Barto, 1998), parameterizing the extent to which the choice rule is 
sensitive to value differences using the inverse temperature parameter (γ ). This 
constitutes the Naïve RL model’s only free parameter, while the Ideal Actor models has a 
second parameter, P(flip), which represents the model’s estimate of the environment 
volatility (assumed to remain constant across a simulation).  
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For our quantitative comparisons, we used choice log-likelihood to quantify the 
extent to which an individual was described by a particular model of choice. For each 
model, we sought parameter estimates that maximized the likelihood of each participant’s 
observed choices given their previous history of choices and outcomes: 
 
where c,t reflects the choice made on trial t,  informed by participant’s choice and 
payoff experience up to trial t. We conducted an exhaustive grid search to optimize 
parameter values for each participant and avoid local minima issues associated with hill-
climbing methods such as the Nelder-Mead method. As the two models differ in their 
number of free parameters, we utilized the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC: 
Schwartz, 1978) to assess model goodness-of-fit, which is calculated by 
 
 
where kmodel is the model’s number of free parameters (1 in the case the Naïve RL 
model and 2 in the case of the Ideal Actor), and  n is the number of trials being fit (the 
same for each model across experiments).  
With these models fully described, we now turn to a behavioral experiment which 
will allow us to disambiguate which type of exploratory choice process—a reflexive and 
stochastic naïve exploration approach or a reflective and belief-driven approach— better 
characterizes human choice behavior.  
 
! 
Lmodel = Pc,t
t
"
! 
BICmodel = "2 # ln(Lmodel ) + kmodel $ ln(n)
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Chapter 3: A Initial Examination of Belief-Directed Exploration Across 
Volatility Rates 
 
This section describes an experiment whose results provide compelling behavioral 
evidence that human exploratory choice is directed by beliefs about the environment 
informed by experience. In this experiment, I manipulate the rate at which the relative 
superiority of the options changes over time, which should impact how decision-makers 
update their beliefs over the course of the experiment. These beliefs—which are 
hypothesized to inform exploratory choice—should presumably affect the levels of 
exploratory choice exhibited by decision-makers.  
If human exploratory is at all directed by beliefs about the environment, then an 
intuitive prediction can be made concerning the relationship between environment 
volatility and the rate of exploratory choice exhibited by participants. In a volatile 
environment, the payoffs associated with the options change rapidly over time, 
necessitating more frequent exploratory choices, but in a comparatively stably 
environment in which the payoffs do not change often, it is intuitive that the participants 
should explore infrequently (Humphreys, Khamassi, & Gurney, 2012).  
We rely on other two complementary analyses to assess the belief-directed nature 
of subjects’ choices in the Leapfrog task. First, we define a hazard rate metric elucidating 
the increasing likelihood of exploratory choice over time, for which reflective and 
reflexive models make clear and divergent predictions. Second, these qualitative results 
in turn motivate quantitative comparison of the extent to which these models characterize 
human choice. To foreshadow, we find that humans are best described by the reflective, 
but myopic, Belief model, suggesting that exploratory choice is not necessarily directed 
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by a planning process that takes into account the value of future information yielded by 
actions. Finally, we analyze people’s choice latencies (that is, RTs) in terms of the Ideal 
Actor’s trial-by-trial action prescriptions, observing that people exhibit larger latencies 
when they act suboptimally, demonstrating the Ideal Actor’s potential as a tool for online, 
process-oriented analysis of exploratory choice behavior. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects 
A total of 139 undergraduates at the University of Texas participated in this 
experiment in exchange for course credit and a small cash bonus tied to proportion of 
trials for which the higher-payoff option was chosen. Participants were randomly 
assigned to three volatility level conditions, defined by the probability at each trial that 
the payoff ordering of options would flip, P(flip): Low Volatility (P(flip) = .025), 
Medium Volatility (P(flip) = .075), and High Volatility (P(flip) = .125). There were 51, 
41, and 47 subjects in the Low, Middle, and High volatility conditions respectively.  
Materials and procedure 
The task instructions explained that one option was always worth 10 more points 
than the other option, and that the superiority of the two options alternated over time and 
that options always changed values by 20 points. Subjects were informed that their 
payment was tied to the number of times they chose the higher-payoff option. 
Additionally, they were told at the outset which option, A or B, was initially superior at 
the start of the experiment and that the experiment consisted of 500 choices in total. The 
bandit task interface consisted of two buttons on a computer screen marked “OPTION A” 
and “OPTION B.”  
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Prior to the main bandit task, subjects completed a number of training trials 
intended to familiarize them with the procedure and the volatility rate. In these training 
trials, participants first completed a passive viewing task in which they viewed 500 trials 
of the bandit task whose payoffs were randomly generated as previously described in the 
section on the Leapfrog task. To focus subjects’ attention on the volatility rather than the 
true payoffs in the volatility-training phase, the payoffs for each option either read 
“SAME” or “CHANGED.” Before each block of 100 trials, participants then provided an 
estimate of the number of flips they expected in the next block.  
Following training, participants completed 500 trials of the main bandit task. On 
each trial, subjects saw the word “CHOOSE” and had 1.5 seconds to make a choice using 
the using the “Z” or “?” keys for the left and right options respectively. Following each 
choice, numerical feedback was provided for one second, indicating the number of points 
that resulted from the choice. When a response deadline was missed, the computer 
displayed the message “TOO SLOW” accompanied by a large red X for one second and 
participant repeated that trial. Payoffs for Options A and B started at 10 and 20 
respectively and, as described above, alternated jumping by 20 points with probability 
governed by P(flip). An example instantiation of the payoffs in the middle volatility 
condition is depicted in Figure 2 along with an example subjects’ sequence of choices. 
 
RESULTS 
We rely on two complementary results to assess the belief-directed nature of 
subjects’ choices in the Leapfrog task. First, we define a hazard rate metric elucidating 
the increasing likelihood of exploratory choice over time, for which reflective and 
reflexive models make clear and divergent predictions. Second, these qualitative results 
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in turn motivate quantitative comparison of the extent to which these models characterize 
human choice. 
Choice  
The primary dependent measure utilized is whether subjects explored or exploited 
on a trial.  We classified each choice made by a participant as either exploratory or 
exploitative based on their experienced payoffs up to that choice point: when the 
decision-maker chose the option with the highest-seen payoffs, that choice was 
considered an exploitative choice, and when they chose the other option, that was 
considered an exploratory choice (cf. Daw et al., 2006). These choices are indicated using 
blue arrowheads in the example subject’s sequence of choices in Figure 2. 
We hypothesized that increasing environment volatility would lead to more 
exploratory choice behavior.  For each subject, we computed their proportion of 
exploratory trials over 25-trial-blocks using the above trial identification procedure. The 
average proportion of exploratory trials, by volatility condition and block, is depicted in 
Figure 5. A two-way (Volatility Condition × Trial Block) mixed ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of volatility condition, F = 149.10, p < .0001, and no significant 
main effect of trial block, F = .42, p = .52 or significant interaction between volatility 
condition and trial block, F = .001, p = .79. This pattern of results suggests that the 
environmental volatility manipulation influenced participants’ tendency to make 
exploratory choices, such that greater volatility resulted in a larger proportion of 
exploratory choices. Further, the lack of significant effect of trial block suggests that 
these exploration patterns reached a steady state early on in the task.  
 26 
 
Figure 5: Average proportion of exploratory choices, over 25-trial blocks, as a 
function of volatility condition. Error bars represent standard error of the 
mean. 
 
This pattern of results is suggestive of a relationship between participants’ 
exploratory behavior and beliefs about the environment. Namely, the Ideal Actor model 
prescribes that one’s representation of the volatility of the environment should inform 
their beliefs about the currently optimal action, which should in turn direct exploratory 
behavior. That participants tuned their frequency of exploratory choices in accordance 
with the true volatility of the environment suggests that participants’ used internally 
calculated beliefs about the environment to direct their exploration of the environment. 
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Figure 6: “Hazard rate of exploration” for the two models under consideration, 
defined as the probability of exploring as a function of the number of 
consecutive exploitative choices after observing a payoff jump. Thus, for 
example, n=4 refers to a situation where, beginning with the observation of 
a jump, three exploitative choices are made before an exploratory choice. 
Critically, the reflective nature of the Ideal Actor results in a monotonically 
increasing hazard rate as the models’ certainty about the relative optimality 
of the options decays over time. 
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Figure 7 depicts the hazard rate of subjects’ exploratory choice across the three 
conditions, calculated as the probability that an exploratory choice is made on trial t 
given a payoff jump was observed on trial t-n, restricted to a 5-trial window. In other 
words, this hazard rate is the probability of making an exploratory choice as a function of 
the number of consecutive exploitative choices made. As a qualitative test of reflective 
exploratory choice behavior, we sought to examine whether participants’ hazard rates 
resembled those of the Ideal Actor or the Naïve RL model more closely.  
 
Figure 7: “Hazard rate of exploration” for participants in Experiment 1 
 
For both models, we calculated the hazard rate of exploration in the same way as 
subjects and report these rates in Figures 6A and 6B. These hazard rates are calculated 
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from 139 simulations—one for each subject in the experiment—of each model allocated 
across the three volatility conditions. Each model was “yoked” to a subject’s particular 
instantiation of the Leapfrog payoff structure and, consequently, their environment 
volatility rate. To determine model choice behavior, we used the average of participants’ 
best-fitting parameter values for each volatility condition and model (listed in the table 
below). It can be seen that subjects’ rate of exploration increased monotonically over 
time, F = 5.96, p < .05), contrasting with the predictions of the purely reflexive Naïve RL 
model but in accordance with the qualitative predictions of the reflective, Ideal Actor 
model. Mirroring the previous analysis of frequency of exploratory choice (Figure 5), 
these hazard rates were higher in more volatile environments explored more frequently, F 
= 31.50, p < .001). Further, there was a significant interaction between environment 
volatility rate and run length of exploitive trials (n), F = 4.47, p < .001.  
 
Model Fits 
Having specified the models computationally, we sought to determine which 
model best characterized participants’ choices across the three volatility conditions. We 
used maximum likelihood estimation to find the set of parameters that maximized the 
likelihood of each model for each subject (this procedure is described in greater detail 
above). Table 1 depicts the best-fitting parameter values for both models across each 
condition as well as summary goodness-of-fit measures. 
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Naïve RL 
Condition Softmax parameter (SD) Total BIC 
P(flip) = 0.025 1.9 (0.04) 16365 
P(flip) = 0.075 1.4 (0.03)  16730 
P(flip) = 0.125 1.1 (0.03) 21134 
 
Ideal Actor 
Condition P(flip) (SD) Softmax param.  (SD) Total BIC 
P(flip) = 0.025 0.01 (0.01) 0.58 (0.23) 16535 
P(flip) = 0.075 0.04 (0.05) 0.55 (0.23)  13995 
P(flip) = 0.125 0.07 (0.07) 0.59 (0.25) 16914 
Table 1. Best-Fitting Parameter Values by Model and Condition in Experiment 1 
 
The proportion of participants best fit by each model is represented Figure 8A. It 
can be seen that very few subjects in the Medium- and High-Volatility conditions (green 
and red respectively) were best fit by the Naïve RL model while the Low-Volatility 
participants (blue) appeared to be evenly split across the two models. To more directly 
examine the relative goodness-of-fit of the two models across individuals, we calculate 
the relative BIC score of the models (calculated as BICNaive – BICActor) for each participant, 
where positive resultant scores indicate an improvement in fit by the Ideal Actor over the 
Naïve RL model. Average relative BIC scores are plotted by condition in Figure 8B. 
Indeed, participants in the Medium- and High-Volatility conditions were inequitably 
better described by the Ideal Actor Model. We provide speculation about the behavior of 
the Low-Volatility participants in the Discussion section below. 
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Figure 8: Model goodness-of-fit measures as a function of model and volatility 
condition. (A) The proportion of participants that were best fit by each 
model in each condition. (B) Logarithms of likelihood ratios (relative BIC) 
comparing the Ideal Actor to the Naïve RL model. 
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Critically, participants’ differing levels of exploration (main effect of volatility 
rate, above) across conditions could not be explained by the stochasticity with which they 
made choices: the best-fitting softmax parameters did not decrease with environment 
volatility in either of the two models. Rather, the differences in rates of exploratory 
choice appear to be accounted for by the best-fitting P(flip) rates, which accords with our 
intuitions about perceived volatility and exploration rate. 
 
Choice Latency (RTs)  
 
We also hypothesized that choice latencies (as measured by RTs) would provide 
an online assessment of a reflective and belief-driven decision process. We intuited that 
RTs would be larger in situations in which participants acted against their beliefs about 
the currently optimal action—that is, people would exhibit larger choice latencies when 
they made errors. 
 Accordingly, we factorially examined exploratory and exploitative choice RTs, 
classifying them as “Explore Optimal” or “Exploit Optimal,” defining the two bins based 
on the Ideal Actor’s choice prescription. To ensure that any effects of choice RT 
observed were not attributable to sequential effects such as response repetitions or 
switches (Walton et al., 2004)—which may be confounded with exploratory choices—we 
first performed a linear regression to partial out these potential effects. This model 
assumed that choice RTs were a linear function of the response repetitions and switches 
(in relation to the present response) of the previous 10 trials. Put another way, the 
regression estimated coefficients across 10 lag lengths (t-1 to t-10) coded as stay/switch 
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relative to the current trial (Bornstein & Daw, in press).  We then performed the analysis 
of interest on the resultant residual RTs. Figure 4 depicts the average median 
reconstructed RTs across the three volatility conditions in the four unique situations 
described above.  
 
 
Figure 9: Adjusted choice reaction times (RTs) across volatility conditions as a 
function of choice type (exploratory versus exploitative) and Ideal Actor 
choice prescription (Exploit Optimal versus Explore Optimal). The outer 
bars depict situations in which participants against the immediate 
prescription of the Ideal Actor. Of note is that across the Medium (P(flip) = 
0.075) and High (P(flip) = 0.125) volatility conditions, participants 
exhibited larger RTs when they acted against the prescription of the Ideal 
Actor. 
 34 
 
 
 
It is apparent that, in the Medium (P(flip)= 0.075) and High (P(flip)= 0.125) 
Volatility conditions, participants exhibited larger choice latencies when they acted 
against the prescription of the Ideal Actor. A mixed-effects linear regression (Pinhero & 
Bates, 2000) conducted on these residual RTs (random effects over subjects) revealed a 
significant interaction between chosen action (explore versus exploit, mirroring 
nonhuman primate results reported by Pearson et al., 2009) and prescribed optimal action 
(exploration-optimal versus exploitation-optimal), β = -8.90, SE = 3.41,  p <  .01. A full 
list of regression coefficients are provided in Table 2. It is important to note that these 
effects are prevalent even when nuisance factors such as switch costs are taken into 
consideration. These patterns did not appear to vary with volatility condition as no 
significant three-way interaction was found, F = .18, p = .67. Participants in the Low-
volatility Condition did not appear to exhibit this marked pattern of choice RTs, which is 
not surprising in light of how poorly their choices were described by the Ideal Actor 
(Figure 8). 
 
 
Coefficient Estimate (SE) p-value 
Volatility -367.13 (185.93) 0.054 
Choice Type 5.96 (3.74) 0.1 
Optimal Choice 3.14 (4.26) 0.24 
Volatility * Choice Type 0.06 (42.21) 0.76 
Volatility * Prescribed Choice 35.06 (48.17) 0.4 
Choice Type * Optimal Choice -8.87 (3.42) 0.006 
Volatility * Choice Type * Prescribed Choice 7.89 (37.99) 0.71 
Table 2: Choice Latency Regression Coefficients 
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DISCUSSION 
We examined whether human decision-makers approach exploratory choice in a 
reflective and belief-directed fashion as opposed to a stochastic and undirected fashion. 
Using a novel task that allowed for unambiguous identification of the two candidate 
strategies, we found that decision-makers appeared to be updating their beliefs about 
relative payoffs in a reflective manner—including knowledge about possible unseen 
changes in the task structure—but did not seem to be fully utilizing these beliefs by 
planning ahead with assessments of the informational value of actions. Indeed, for both 
subjects and reflective models, hazard rates reveal that the probability of exploratory 
choice increases with the number of immediately previous consecutive exploitive choices 
(see Figure 2). This behavior is not predicted by the reflexive, Naïve RL model.  
Given the reflexive and reflective models’ qualitatively different predictions of 
sequential dependency in choice, this comparison affords a strong test for determining 
which type of belief-updating better matches human behavior. Furthermore, our 
quantitative model comparisons revealed that the reflective model clearly provides better 
a better characterization of behavior than the purely reflexive Naïve RL model. These 
results suggest that people do exhibit marked sequentially dependency and that their 
belief updates are reflective. Critically, participants’ differing levels of exploration across 
conditions could not be explained by the stochasticity with which they made choices: the 
best-fitting softmax parameters did not decrease with environment volatility in either of 
the two models (Table 1). Rather, the differences in rates of exploratory choice appear to 
be accounted for by the best-fitting P(flip) rates. 
It is curious that the Low-Volatility (P(flip) = 0.025, blue bars in Figure 8) 
appeared to be better characterized by a Naïve RL account of behavior than our reflective 
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Ideal Observer account, in contrast to the other volatility conditions. I suspect that this is 
a result of an explicit strategy participants may have been employing defined by counting 
the number of trials that have elapsed between exploratory choices. Given that fewer 
exploratory choices are made—and warranted—in the Low-Volatility condition, 
participants may have a more difficult time tracking the number of consecutive 
exploitative choices made, resulting in an inconsistent policy. Alternately, the small 
number of payoff flips observed may lead to inference about a qualitatively different task 
structure, causing participants to adopt a qualitatively choice policy defined by occasional 
and random (i.e., naïve) exploration. Either possibility could result in a poor quantitative 
fit by the Ideal Actor. While these speculative explanations of choice behavior are not 
directly testable in the present data set, the subsequent studies in this document 
exclusively use a Medium-Volatility (P(flip) = 0.075) environment. 
Notably, we also found that when decision-makers in medium and high-volatility 
environments made sub-optimal decisions (insofar as the choices did not accord with the 
Ideal Actor’s prescription), they exhibited larger choice RTs compared to when they 
made optimal choices. Since the Ideal Actor’s choice prescriptions are a function of 
subjects’ inferred trial-by-trial beliefs, these choice RTs provide another window into the 
belief-directed and reflective nature of their choices. Indeed, previous experimental work 
revealed that decision-makers exhibit greater choice latency when choosing options that 
will result in increased cognitive costs (Botvinick & Rosen, 2009) or when perceived 
logical conflict—and thus, the potential for making erroneous responses—is high 
(DeNeys & Glumicic, 2008). This result, while compelling in its own right, makes 
broader contributions to this line of work. That participants’ choice latencies were to 
some extent explained by hidden variables inferred by the Ideal Actor suggests—above 
and beyond their choice behavior—that decision-makers’ approach the leapfrog task in a 
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belief-directed, reflective manner. Further, the apparent leverage afforded by the Ideal 
Actor in understanding these RTs suggests that this model is well posed as a data analysis 
tool for physiological variables. We turn to analysis of such variables in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Belief-Directed Exploratory Choice and its Physiological 
Correlates 
 
 
A major contribution of this work examines the relationship between internally 
calculated beliefs and autonomic arousal—indexed using SCR—preceding choices. The 
previous experiment demonstrates we have found a reasonable model for describing 
decision-makers’ behavior and moreover, a reasonable procedure for estimating 
participants’ beliefs on a trial-by-trial basis, using the Ideal Actor. Further, the previous 
experiment revealed a rather stereotyped relationship between choice latency 
(operationalized as RTs) and the trial-by-trial prescriptions of the Ideal Actor, suggesting 
that choices may not always be optimal decision-makers still have some knowledge of 
what the optimal action is. In Experiment 2, we utilize the same analysis techniques to 
uncover a possible relationship between a decision-maker’s knowledge about the optimal 
action and anticipatory SCRs. Revealing, in the proposed work, that choice times and 
autonomic arousal track belief-related quantities during decision-making would provide a 
compelling demonstration that decision-makers are using beliefs to direct their 
negotiation of exploration-exploitation dilemma. 
Like the preceding RT analysis, I propose to use the Ideal Observer analysis to 
examine how signals arising from a reflective, belief-driven exploration process bear on 
anticipatory autonomic arousal as indexed by SCRs. SCR measures have been used as an 
index autonomic arousal in investigations of psychological questions concerning 
information processing, emotion, and attention (Dawson, Schell, & Fillion, 2007). For 
example, elevated SCRs have been demonstrated to accompany logical “conflict” due in 
 39 
syllogistic reasoning (DeNeys et al., 2010) and the commission of response errors in 
basic cognitive control tasks (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003; Kobayashi, Yoshino, 
Takahashi, & Nomura, 2007).  
Perhaps more notably, a number of studies have examined SCRs occurring just 
prior to choices when participants make repeated gambles in the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT), finding that people exhibit elevated SCRs just prior to choosing options that have 
a high risk of monetary loss compared to less risky decks (Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio, 
1994). In the IGT, drawing from certain (“high-risk”) decks potentially results in large 
monetary losses while drawing from other decks does not. While it is reasonable to 
assume that the decks differ in the amount of uncertainty associated with them in a 
qualitative sense, the structure of the IGT is not amenable to trial-by-trial inference of 
participants’ internal beliefs about the decks and consequently, their beliefs about the 
relative advantageousness of the choices. Accordingly, the origin of these choice-related 
SCRs has been the subject of much debate (Dunn et al., 2006; Tomb et al., 2002). 
Further, because the actions are tied in the task to stimuli that remain constant over the 
course of the task—rather than shifting dynamically as in the leapfrog task—it is not 
entirely clear whether anticipatory autonomic arousal is related to the specific stimulus 
item being chosen or some internally calculated variable representing advantageousness 
of the action. A model-based examination of the relationship between the trial-by-trial 
optimality of choice and SCRs will provide a more rigorous and quantitative 
characterization of the anticipatory autonomic arousal exhibited by humans as they 
approach decisions. The proposed work will elucidate the role that anticipatory SCRs 
play in decision-making—which has found itself hotly debated in the past (Dunn, 
Dagliesh, & Lawrence, 2006; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Tomb, Hauser, Dedlin, & 
Caramazza, 2002). 
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A large body of previous work has demonstrated that anticipatory SCRs may 
index potential “regret” resulting from the choice about to be made. In the IGT, decision-
makers exhibit larger SCRs just prior to actions with potential monetary losses (Bechara 
et al., 1997, 1999; Tomb, Hauser, Deldin, & Caramazza, 2002). Likewise, Botvinick and 
Rosen (2009) found that decision-makers show larger SCRs just prior to choices that 
result in large cognitive demands—in other words, anticipation of cognitive costs. It may 
be the case that the anticipatory SCRs merely index potential regret arising from 
exploratory choices—that is, when a participant has chosen the option with the lesser-
known-value according to their experience. As Experiment 1 suggests that people appear 
sensitive to the change in the relative value of the exploratory action exploring over time 
(i.e., exploring becomes more advantageous as more consecutive exploitative choices 
have been made, Figure 7), we may find that anticipatory arousal may be indexing a more 
sophisticated computation reflecting the current advantageousness of the chosen option. 
To effectively investigate this, I aim to reveal how a) behavior appears to bear the 
influence of a belief directed exploratory choice process and b) SCRs actually reflect the 
trial-by-trial optimality of a choice as calculated by the Ideal Actor. In this experiment, 
we examine participants’ SCRs in the course of decision-making in the same task as in 
Experiment 1—fixing the volatility rate to the middle volatility rate—suggesting a 
relationship between autonomic arousal and exploratory choice.  
This model-based analysis presented below provides a finer-grained explanation 
for the SCR differences found between exploratory and exploitative trials. To the best of 
my knowledge, there are no published examples of investigators using cognitive models 
to uncover “hidden” variables that bear on skin conductance responses. While this 
technique has been extensively employed in the neuroimaging literature (e.g., Behrens et 
al., 2007; O’Doherty et al., 2003) the work proposed would be the first use of model-
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based analyses to reveal how a more abstract, inferred valuation process can drive this 
particular index of autonomic arousal.  
 
METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-five undergraduates at the University of Texas completed this experiment 
for course credit plus a small cash bonus tied to task performance.  
Materials and Procedure 
After providing written consent, participants were provided with the same 
instructions as used in the previous experiment except for additional instructions 
regarding the response deadline procedure. The environment volatility P(flip) was set to 
0.075, mirroring the medium volatility condition of the previous experiment.  
To allow for measurement of Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs), the task 
timing was modified (see Figure 10).  Participants were first presented with a pre-choice 
(anticipatory) period, which instructed them to “THINK ABOUT YOUR CHOICE,” 
followed by prompt to make their choice. Participants had 1.5 seconds to make a choice 
using the “K” and “L” keys, and if they failed to respond, they were presented with a 
screen that read “TOO SLOW, TRY AGAIN” and the trial was repeated. After their 
choice, the outcome was displayed for 1 second. An inter-trial interval (ITI), in which a 
fixation cross was displayed, occurred between each trial, ranging from 2-6 seconds with 
a mean of 3 seconds. Participants completed 200 of these trials and were paid and 
debriefed upon conclusion of the experiment. 
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Figure 10: Task flow design utilized in Experiment 2. 
 
Skin Conductance Measurement Equipment 
SCRs were measured using Ag-AgCl electrodes attached to the crease between 
the distal and middle phalanges of the first and second digits of the left hand. The SCR 
data were recorded with a BIOPAC Systems (Goleta, CA) skin conductance module at a 
rate of 200 samples per second connected to a laptop computer. 
Skin Conductance Analysis 
SCR was measured using Ag-AgCl electrodes attached to the crease between the 
distal and middle phalanges of the first and second digits of the left hand. SCR data were 
 43 
recorded with a BIOPAC unit at a rate of 200hz. To analyze anticipatory SCRs, we 
employed a deconvolution technique (Benedek & Karenbach, 2010) that allows for 
separation and quantification of both phasic (i.e., short peaks resulting from sudomotor 
nerve bursts) and tonic components of the skin conductance signal. The method is based 
upon a physiological model of the general SCR shape and aims at retrieving the activity 
properties of the underlying sudomotor nerve activity, in order to avoid underestimation 
biases due to overlapping responses. This technique was implemented using Ledalab 
package for MATLAB developed by this technique’s authors (http://www.ledalab.de). 
Integrated phasic SCR—that is, the inferred phasic driver signal summed over time—was 
assessed during the 7.5s anticipatory period starting at the onset of the “THINK ABOUT 
YOUR CHOICE” prompt ending at feedback onset. To rule out the possible influence of 
task novelty on SCRs, the first 10 trials were excluded from the analysis (Davis & Love, 
2009). SCR magnitudes were transformed using a log+1 procedure to remove negative 
skew and z-transformed within participants to allow for intersubject comparison. 
 
RESULTS 
Choice Behavior 
We applied the same procedure as in the previous experiment to classify 
participants’ choices as exploratory or exploitative. Across all participants, average 
proportion of exploratory trials was 0.20 (SD = .09), essentially mirroring the proportion 
of exploratory trials found in the medium volatility condition in the previous experiment 
(M = 0.21, SD = .10). In other words, the same level of volatility (P(flip) = 0.075) evoked 
similar degrees of exploratory behavior across the two experiments. Because choices 
were presumably made in the anticipatory period—that is, the period before responses 
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could actually be made by participants—we did not see fit to analyze RT data for 
exploratory versus exploitative trials. 
Hazard Rates of Exploration 
The Ideal Actor and Naïve RL model make divergent predictions about the hazard 
rates of exploration. The predicted hazard rates arising from simulations of the two 
models are depicted in Figure 11A. As in Experiment 1, these hazard rates are calculated 
from 45 simulations—one for each subject in the experiment—of the two models. Each 
model was “yoked” to a subject’s particular instantiation of the Leapfrog payoff structure 
and, consequently, their environment volatility rate. To generate the simulations depicted 
in Figure 11A, we used the average of participants’ best-fitting parameter values for each 
volatility condition and model. As in the previous experiment, the critical qualitative 
difference between the two accounts of choice is the monotonically increasing hazard rate 
of the reflective and belief-direct Ideal Actor, which contrasts with the flat hazard rate of 
the fully reflexive Naïve RL model. Figure 11B reveals that participants revealed a 
monotonically increasing hazard rate. Indeed, we found a significant effect of streak 
length n, F=40.85, p<.0001, qualitatively mimicking the monotonic hazard rate predicted 
by the Ideal Actor. 
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Figure 11: Panel A: Predicted hazard rates of exploration for the Ideal Actor (blue) and 
Naïve RL models (red). Panel B: Observed average hazard rate for 
participants in Experiment 2 which exhibits the monotonically increasing 
signature of the Belief-Directed models. Error bars represent standard error 
of the mean. 
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Model-Based Analysis 
Following our model-based analysis in the previous experiment, we fit the two 
models to participants’ choices in the present study in order to quantitatively characterize 
the extent to which choice resembled a belief-directed process. Accordingly, Table 3 
presents two complementary goodness-of-fit metrics: the proportion of participants best 
fit by each model and the summed BIC scores for each model. Additionally, best fitting 
parameter values for each model are shown. 
 
 
Model 
Prop. Subjects 
Best Fit Total BIC 
Softmax 
Parameter (SD) 
Estimated P(flip) 
(SD) 
Naïve RL 0.13 11402.24 0.07(0.05) N/A 
Ideal Actor 0.87 9513.46 0.34(0.13) 0.03(0.03) 
Table 3: Model Fit Summary in Experiment 2 
 
Indeed, the vast majority (87%) of participants were better fit by the Ideal Actor 
model than by the Naïve RL model. This is reflected in both the proportions of subjects 
fit and the group BIC scores (Table 3). Having established that the Ideal Actor model 
provides a reasonable description of participants’ behavior, we sought to use the model to 
better understand anticipatory SCRs in the subsequent analyses.  
 
Anticipatory SCRs 
We examined the phasic component of decision-makers’ anticipatory SCRs 
across exploitative and exploratory trials using the simple trial classification scheme 
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described above. Our initial analysis focused on contrasting SCRs accompanying 
exploratory versus exploitative choices. Figure 12 depicts anticipatory SCRs as a function 
of these two basic trial types. We found that participants exhibited significantly larger 
SCRs accompanying exploratory trials than exploitative SCRs, (paired t=2.09, p<.05). 
However, this rather coarse analysis does not afford assessment of the role of a reflective, 
belief-directed system in physiological arousal: it is conceivable that either choice 
system—reflexive or reflective—could have generated these signals. 
 
 
Figure 12: Anticipatory Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs) in Experiment 2. (A) 
SCRs accompanying Exploitative versus Exploratory choices. All SCRs are 
reported as z-scores computed from the log-transformed integrated phasic 
SCR. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
Accordingly, we leveraged the Ideal Actor’s trial-by-trial prescriptions of choice 
to understand how decision-makers’ beliefs about the currently optimal action might 
drive SCRs at choice. Accordingly, we factorially examined exploratory and exploitative 
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choice SCRs, classifying them as “Explore Optimal” or “Exploit Optimal” as defined by 
the Ideal Actor’s prescription. Figure 13 reveals that, upon closer inspection, decision-
makers’ SCRs reflect a pattern characterized by greater arousal accompanying model-
assessed suboptimal choices (outer bars) and comparatively less arousal on model-
assessed optimal choices (inner bars). An ANOVA confirmed that the interaction was 
statistically reliable (F=7.02, p<.01) and furthermore there were no significant main 
effects of participant-generated trial type (F=.04, p=.83) or Ideal Actor-prescribed trial 
type (F=.66, p=.42), confirming the presence of a crossover interaction.  
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Figure 13: Exploratory and Exploitative choices decomposed according to the Ideal 
Actor’s prescription at time of choice. Blue bars indicate trials in which the 
participant made an exploratory action while red bars indicate trials in which 
the participant made an exploitative action. The outer two bars depict SCRs 
accompanying choices where decision-makers acted against the prescription 
of the Ideal Actor. Conversely, the inner two bars depict SCRs in choices in 
which decision-makers acted in accordance with the Ideal Actor. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. 
 
 
It was additionally hypothesized that the extent to which a participant’s choices 
reflected a belief-based exploratory choice process might predict how they respond 
physiologically to suboptimal choices. For each participant we calculated the extent to 
which their SCRs differentiated between suboptimal versus optimal choices, which we 
 50 
term the SCR Sensitivity Index. This metric quantifies how much an individual decision-
maker exhibited the stereotyped crossover interaction pattern seen across the entire group 
(Figure 13) and is calculated as: 
 
[ SCR(Exploit | Explore Optimal) - SCR(Exploit | Exploit Optimal ] – 
[ SCR(Explore | Exploit Optimal) - SCR(Explore | Explore Optimal ] 
 
To quantify an individual decision-maker’s degree of behavioral agreement with 
the Ideal Actor we used the log-likelihood of that model. Figure 14 reveals that model 
goodness-of-fit was strongly correlated with SCR Sensitivity index. Indeed the Pearson 
correlation between the two measures was significant, r=.50, p<.01. In other words, the 
more a decision-maker’s behavior reflected a reflective choice process, the larger their 
physiological responses to suboptimal choice (inferred by a reflective model) were. 
 
 51 
 
Figure 14: Observed correlation between Ideal Actor Goodness-of-fit (abscissa) and 
calculated individual SCR sensitivity index (ordinate). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 2 utilized the leapfrog choice paradigm in order to understand 
physiological signals accompanying exploratory choice. Qualitatively, we found that 
participants’ choices (Figure 11B) appeared to be a mixture of a reflective choice strategy 
(Figure 11A) with a naïve and stochastic choice strategy (Figure 11A). Quantitatively, 
participants were well described by a reflexive, belief-updating choice process, which let 
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us turn to the Ideal Actor’s trial-by-trial prescriptions of choice in order to examine 
anticipatory autonomic arousal. 
We found that decision-makers registered increased autonomic arousal—as 
indexed by SCR—when they made exploratory compared to exploitative choices. While 
this result is novel as no other investigations to my knowledge have directly examined 
anticipatory SCRs as they pertains to exploration/exploitation, the pattern is intuitive as 
elevated SCRs have been demonstrated to accompany choices that carry high risk for 
potential monetary losses (Bechara et al. 1997; Tomb et al., 2002) and future cognitive 
costs (Botvinick & Rosen, 2009). A more nuanced model-based analysis, using the trial-
by-trial prescriptions of the Ideal Actor, compellingly suggests that participants’ choice-
related autonomic arousal somehow reflected an optimal decision-making process 
without necessarily manifesting it through choice. Still, these SCRs echo those found 
accompanying response errors in basic control tasks (Critchley et al., 2005; Hajcak et al., 
2003). 
 Further, we found that the extent to which a decision-maker differentiated 
physiologically between optimal choices (in which their actions accorded with the Ideal 
Actor) and suboptimal choices (in which their actions contradicted those of the Ideal 
Actor) predicted the extent to which his or her behavior was characterized by a reflective, 
belief-driven choice strategy. Put another way, the more reflective a decision-makers’ 
behavior appeared the larger their physiological response to suboptimal choice. Notably, 
Bechara and colleagues (1996; 1999) find a similar relationship between physiological 
differentiation between choice types (advantageous versus disadvantageous) and 
advantageous choice behavior in the IGT.    However it should be noted this relationship 
was established comparing healthy controls to patients with lesions to the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Our result suggests that leapfrog choice paradigm is sensitive 
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enough to draw out such a relationship from the behavioral and physiological variability 
inherent in a normal (non-clinical) population. Hinson and colleagues (2002) report a 
suggestive relationship between SCR discriminability of good versus bad options and 
gambling performance (as indexed by the number of advantageous, low-risk choices) in a 
variant of the IGT. It should be noted, however, that this study reported an inconsistent 
ordinal relationship between the magnitude of anticipatory SCRs and choice 
advantageousness in their task. Further discussion of the findings of Hinson et al. (2002) 
as it relates to the present work is provided in the General Discussion of this document.  
It is worth noting that the apparent combination of strategies seen in participants’ 
behavior (Figure 11B) mirrors findings in other work research revealing that human 
choice in a multi-step RL  task appears to bear the influence of both model-based (i.e., 
reflective) and model-free  (i.e., reflexive) strategies (Daw et al., 2011, Glascher, Daw, 
Dayan, & O’Doherty, 2010; Otto, Gershman, Markman, & Daw, under review).  The 
intriguing possibility that these two components of behavior—which can be identified 
using the modeling approach developed in this document—may be in some way 
behaviorally dissociable is addressed in Experiment 3.   
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Chapter 5: An Examination Of The Cognitive Costs Of Belief-Directed 
Exploratory Choice 
 
The preceding experiments suggest human decision-makers bear the behavioral 
signature of a reflective, belief-driven exploration strategy. Behaviorally, decision-
makers’ choices in Experiment 1 appeared to manifest a hybrid strategy combining the 
belief-directed Ideal Actor, whose exploration is guided by evolving beliefs about the 
underlying state of the environment, and a naïve, reflexive strategy whose source of 
exploration is stochastic choice (Figure 2). The notion that there may be distinct and 
separable sources of exploration is evocative of contemporary theories positing the 
parallel operation of reflective model-based choice system which uses an internal model 
of environment structure to guide choice and a reflexive, model-free choice system which 
is only informed by its direct experience (Daw et al., 2005). Indeed the two systems are 
distinguished from each other in part by the cognitive costs they impose (Keramati, 
Dezfouli, & Piray, 2011). Accordingly, we intuited that belief-based exploration—by 
virtue of its full utilization of the environment structure—has the characteristics of a 
model-based choice strategy, while the naïve reflexive strategy echoes a model-free 
strategy informed only by directly experienced payoffs.  
In Experiment 3 we attempted to disentangle the two sources of exploration with 
the intuition that belief-directed exploration imposes greater requirements on decision-
makers’ central executive resources than does stochastic, naïve exploration. Accordingly, 
in a third experiment we demonstrate that decision-makers placed under concurrent 
working memory (WM) load—which fosters reliance on putatively implicit systems in 
categorization (Filoteo, Lauritzen, & Maddox; Waldron & Ashby, 2001; Zeithamova & 
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Maddox, 2006), probabilistic classification (Foerde et al., 2006) and simple binary 
decision-making (Otto et al., 2011)—reverts exploratory choice behavior to a cognitively 
inexpensive mode of operation characterized quantitatively by the Naïve RL model. More 
recent work informed by a modern RL framework demonstrates that concurrent WM load 
appears to remove the influence of a model-based strategy on choice, reverting decision-
makers to a pure-model free choice strategy (Otto, Gershman, Markman, & Daw, under 
review) in a multistep decision task. Indeed, the distinction made between a reflexive and 
reflective exploration strategies closely echoes the notion of model-based and model-free 
choice strategies in other tasks. 
We chose the tone-counting task used by Foerde et al. (2006) and Otto et al. 
(2011) as our concurrent WM load manipulation. In brief, decision-makers are required 
to keep cumulative track of high-pitched tones over the response and feedback stages of 
each trial, occasionally reporting these counts in order to afford assessment of concurrent 
task engagement. Recently we revealed that this concurrent WM load manipulation 
qualitatively shifted participants from a putatively WM-based win-stay-lose-shift strategy 
to a strategy characterized by a gradual integration of past events in a simple decision-
making task (Otto et al., 2011). Using the qualitative and quantitative metrics developed 
in the previous two experiments, we then demonstrate how WM load appears to be 
involved in carrying out a reflective, belief-driven exploratory choice strategy. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
68 participants were randomly assigned to two groups: the Single-Task condition 
and the Dual-Task condition. To ensure that Dual-Task participants did not trade off 
performance on the concurrent task in order to complete the primary task, we excluded 
the data of 10 Dual-Task participants who exhibited a Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) 
of 30 or greater on the concurrent task. 
Materials and Procedure 
Both groups completed 300 trials of the choice task using the same structure and 
volatility rate (P(flip) = 0.075) as in the Medium-Volatility condition of Experiment 1. 
The Dual-Task condition followed the general tone-counting procedure of Foerde et al. 
(2006) but was modified to ensure that the concurrent task persisted over boh the 
response and feedback stages of the decision task (Otto et al., 2011). We used a deadline 
procedure to ensure that, between conditions, a fixed amount of time elapsed each trial. 
On each trial, participants saw the word “CHOOSE” and had 1.5 seconds to make a 
response, after which the resultant payoff was displayed for 1 second followed by a 
variable length inter-trial-interval (Poisson with mean 3, range 2-6 seconds). The “K” and 
“L” keys were used to make actions to the left and right actions respectively. To ensure 
that the concurrent task did not interfere with participants’ ability to learn the volatility 
rate, participants completed a passive viewing of a random instantiation of the bandit task 
for 500 trials before the choice task. 
In the Dual-Task condition, two types of tones, high-pitched (1000 Hz) and low-
pitched (500 Hz) were played during each trial. Each trial was divided into 6 intervals of 
250 ms, with tones occurring in intervals 3-10 (500-2,500ms after trial onset). The 
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number of tones presented each trial varied uniformly between 1 and 4 occurred 
randomly with the constraint that they were played in intervals 2-5. The base rate of high 
tones was determined randomly every 50 trials, varying uniformly between .3 and .7. 
Participants were instructed to maintain a running count of the number of high tones 
while ignoring the low-pitched tones. At the end of each 50-trial block, participants were 
prompted to report their high tone counts using the computer keyboard and were 
subsequently instructed to restart their counts at zero for the next block. 
 
RESULTS 
Exploratory Choice  
Critically, we found no significant effect of WM load upon overall rate of 
exploratory choice (condition F=.22, p=.64), ruling out the possibilities that concurrent 
WM impeded exploration altogether or  rendered participants insensitive to the options’ 
payoffs (Figure 15). Further, these exploration rates reached a steady state early on across 
both groups (25-trial block F=.74, p=.48) as pre-training both groups participants on the 
environmental volatility rate presumably stabilized exploration rates early on.  
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Figure 8: Proportion of exploratory choice across Single-Task (blue) and Dual-Task 
(red) participants, as a function of 25-trial block. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
 
Because the volatility rate is the same as in the preceding experiment, we utilize 
the same predicted hazard rates of explorations for the two models (Figure 11 A). 
Qualitatively we predicted that the hazard rates (calculated the same way as in the 
previous experiments) of Dual-Task participants would be less sloped than Single-Task 
participants as their reliance on a strategy resembling the Naïve RL model should yield a 
flatter hazard rate.  Figure 16  reveals that these predictions were borne out in the hazard 
rates of exploration among Single-Task and Dual-Task participants as Dual-Task 
participants exhibited markedly less sloped hazard rates. Critically a two-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction between group (Single-Task vs. Dual-Task) and 
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exploitative choice streak length n,  F = 5.49, p <. 05, indicating that the slope of the 
hazard rates were different across Single-Task and Dual-Task groups. Additionally there 
was a significant effect of streak length n, F =32.31, p < .0001. Corroborating the 
previous overall exploration rate analysis there was no significant main effect of 
condition (Single-Task versus Dual-Task), F = .19, p  = .66. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Hazard rate of exploratory choice averaged across Single-Task and Dual-
Task participants. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Model-Based Analysis 
To quantitatively illustrate Single-Task and Dual-Task groups’ differential 
reliance upon exploration strategies, we performed a model comparison, examining the 
relative goodness-of-fit of the Ideal Actor model and the Naïve RL model across the two 
conditions. More specifically we calculated a relative BIC score, BICNaive – BICActor, which 
quantifies how much better a participant’s behavior is described by the Ideal Actor than 
by the Naïve RL model. Intuitively, positive scores indicate a better fit by the Ideal Actor 
while negative scores indicate a better fit by the Naïve RL model.  Figure 17 depicts 
relative BIC scores of Single-Task and Dual-Task participants, revealing that Single-Task 
participants were significantly better characterized by the Ideal Actor model (t=2.13, 
p<.05) than by the Naïve RL model and Dual-Task participants were significantly better 
characterized by the Naïve RL model than the Ideal Actor. 
Using this metric we also examined the possibility that Dual-Task participants 
could be trading off performance in the concurrent task in order to make choices in the 
leapfrog task. If this were true we might find that larger relative BIC scores (indicating 
better description of behavior by the Ideal Actor) accompany more erroneous tone-
counting performance. We found no significant relationship between the two quantities, 
r=.22, p=.48, suggesting against the possibility of an internal tradeoff occurring.  
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Figure 17: Average relative goodness-of-fit between the Ideal Actor and the Naïve RL 
model (calculated as a difference in BIC scores) between Single-Task and 
Dual-Task participants. Positive values indicate that a decision-maker’s 
choices were better described by the Ideal Actor and negative values 
indicate that a decision-maker’s choices were better described by the Naïve 
RL model. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this experiment we examined the cognitive costs of a reflective exploration 
strategy, with the intuition that placing decision-makers under concurrent WM load 
should foster increased reliance on a more reflexive strategy. We found that concurrent 
WM load caused decision-makers to revert to a more reflexive, naïve exploration strategy 
characterized by the Naïve RL model, while decision-makers unencumbered by 
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concurrent demands bore a stronger influence of the a reflective choice strategy. This 
qualitative pattern was evident in the hazard rates of exploration of Single-Task versus 
Dual-Task participants: under concurrent WM load, decision-makers exhibited hazard 
rates of exploration characteristic of a naïve and reflexive choice strategy whose 
exploration is stochastic and undirected. Unencumbered by concurrent cognitive 
demands, participants revealed a monotonically increasing hazard—echoing the Ideal 
Actor’s predicted hazard rate (Figure 11A)—suggesting that they solved the exploration 
problem in leapfrog task in a reflective and belief-directed fashion.  
More quantitatively, our modeling approach affords identification of these 
strategies as the two models we compared provide quantification of how well behavior is 
captured by one strategy versus the other. Indeed these model fits corroborate our 
empirically assessed hazard rates of exploration: both measures indicate how concurrent 
cognitive demands attenuated the influence of a reflective and belief-based exploratory 
choice strategy and fostered increased reliance on a naïve, stochastic strategy. This set of 
findings underscores the importance of central executive resources in implementing a 
reflective and belief-directed decision strategy and further demonstrate the descriptive 
value of our models of choice. Indeed, other theoretical work posits a central role for 
cognitive costs in the arbitration of model-based (i.e., reflective) and model-free 
(reflexive) control systems (Keramati et al., 2011). Recent empirical work examining the 
contributions of these strategies underscores the reliance of model-based choice strategy 
upon the availability of central executive resources (Otto et al., under review), however it 
should be noted that model-based behavior in this study was not characterized by 
reflective belief-updating in the absence of payoff observations but rather use of a 
forward model that prospectively values actions in accordance with the environment’s 
transition structure.  
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Often when studies show a shift in behavior brought about by concurrent WM 
load, researchers often make the case for some form of explicit learning being interrupted 
or impeded by the concurrent task demands (Filoteo et al., 2010; Foerde et al., 2006; Otto 
et al, 2011; Samanez-Larkin, Wagner, & Knutson, 2011; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). 
While it is difficult to argue that reflexive strategy—as characterized by the Naïve RL 
model—is indeed implemented by an implicit system by decision-makers here, there is 
an intuitive and plausible answer for why Dual-Task participants exhibited a reduced 
influence of a reflective choice strategy. Participants under Single-Task conditions may 
have been enacting an explicit strategy whereby they count the number of exploitative 
trials that have elapsed since the last exploratory trial. Indeed, enacting such a strategy 
would give rise to choice behavior very similar to the Ideal Actor (see example run in 
Figure 4). It appears reasonable then, that the tone-counting task imposed on participants 
may have disrupted this strategy and either a) caused participants to perform a degenerate 
and erroneous version of a trial-counting strategy or b) shifted the onus of decision-
making to an entirely different, putatively implicit system. While the first possibility 
seems like a more parsimonious explanation for this pattern of results, these results leave 
the question open for future research. 
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
The exploration-exploitation dilemma in choice is a subject of interest in both the 
artificial intelligence (e.g., Dayan & Sejnowski, 1996; Sutton et al., 1990) and cognitive 
neurosciences (e.g. Cohen et al., 1997; Daw et al., 2006; Badre et al, 2012). While 
previous work has computationally characterized human exploratory choice as 
randomness or stochasticity in choice rules (e.g., Daw et al., 2006; Jepma & Niewenhuis, 
2001; Otto et al., 2010; Worthy et al., 2007), this work sought to characterize a more 
nuanced form of exploratory choice behavior that we term belief-directed exploration.  
Leveraging a contemporary reinforcement-learning framework (Dayan et al., 2009; 
Keramati et al., 2011), we ascribe these stochastic versus belief-directed forms of 
behavior to a reflexive versus reflective controller respectively. In these contributions, 
briefly summarized below, we found compelling behavioral evidence for such a reflective 
and belief-directed form of exploration as well as patterns of physiological arousal that 
appear to reflect such a process. 
First, we devised a novel task that affords a number of key features. The 
behavioral signatures of a principled, belief-directed account of exploratory choice versus 
stochastic uninformed exploration are qualitatively different, affording disambiguation. 
The task’s constrained structure allows for specification of an Ideal Actor model, which 
prescribes a statistically optimal pattern of reflective choice and makes different 
predictions than a stochastic and reflexive model of behavior (termed the Naïve RL 
model here). Using these computational instantiations of choice strategies, we are able to 
quantitatively characterize human choice in a number of experiments, revealing evidence 
for the contributions of a reflexive, belief-directed exploration system. Experiment 1 
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(Chapter 3) provided an initial examination of this behavior in a number of different 
environment volatilities—presumed to influence exploratory choice rates—and showed 
that participants—barring those in the Low-Volatility condition—were by and large 
better characterized by a reflective exploration strategy than by a purely reflexive and 
stochastic account. Beyond providing an initial demonstration of the validity of our 
model-based analyses, we found a compelling pattern of choice latencies, revealing how 
beliefs about the relative optimality of exploiting versus exploring can be uncovered in 
basic psychometric variables and demonstrating the potential of the reflective, Ideal 
Actor model as a data analysis tool. 
Experiment 2 went further by revealing how signals putatively emanating from a 
belief-directed choice system might be registered physiologically. One basic result—
which to our knowledge has not been revealed in other published work—was that 
exploratory choices were accompanied by markedly larger SCRs than were exploitative 
choices. Upon closer inspection, these signals appeared to be driven by some form of 
belief-directed assessment of the currently optimal action, with larger SCRs 
accompanying Ideal Actor-assessed suboptimal choices. To my knowledge of other 
published work, this is the first trial-by-trial, model-based examination of SCRs. Perhaps 
more compellingly, we found that the extent to which participants’ SCRs differentiated 
between optimal and suboptimal choices predicted the extent to which their behavior bore 
the influence of a reflective, belief-based exploration strategy. In other words, the more 
reflective a decision-makers’ behavior appeared to be, the more their patterns of choice-
related of autonomic arousal appeared to exhibit influence of a reflective choice system.  
Experiment 3 investigated the apparent mixture of reflexive and reflective choice 
strategies found in the previous two experiments—which is evocative of the mixture seen 
in other sequential decision-making paradigms in which the two strategies can be 
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identified (Daw et al., 2011; Otto et al., under review). Accordingly, we tested the a 
notion that the contributions of a reflective choice strategy—by virtue of its 
computational complexity and its hypothesized cognitive cost—should be diminished 
when decision-makers are placed under concurrent cognitive load. Indeed, when 
burdened with concurrent working memory demands, decision-makers reverted to a 
naïve, reflexive form of exploratory choice behavior. 
While we sought out originally to disentangle two possible sources of 
exploration—that is, a stochastic and reflexive exploration strategy and a reflective and 
belief-directed exploration strategy—participants appeared to exhibit a mixture of the two 
strategies. For example, in Experiment 2, the hazard rates shown in Figure 11B reveal 
that participants appear to reflect somewhat of a mixture of the Ideal Actor and the Naïve 
RL model. This mixture appeared to be apparent at the group level (i.e., a small 
proportion of participants in Experiment 2 were best characterized by the Naïve RL 
model) also within individuals themselves. In the cotemporary model-based/model-free 
distinction in RL, similar mixtures at the individual level have been found in sequential 
decision-making (Glascher et al., 2010; Otto et al., under review). Indeed, a dual-systems 
view—ascribing the choice behavior seen here to a mixture of two separate controllers—
provides a compelling albeit speculative answer to the question raised in Experiment 2: 
why are decision-makers acting in situations in which they appear to “know” (insofar as 
registering autonomic signals) that they are making suboptimal choices?  
The apparent mixture we observe in choice may reflect the operation of a 
reflective controller competing with a naïve controller that prescribes exploratory choice 
in an undirected fashion. While the two systems may be in accord (i.e., both prescribe 
exploration or exploitation) on a single trial they can also generate conflicting choice 
recommendations. However, the more sophisticated reflective system may be sensitive to 
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when choice behavior deviates from its own prescriptions and consequently, generates an 
autonomic response (i.e., SCR). This scheme provides an explanation for autonomic 
arousal patterns observed in Experiment 2, in which decision-makers registered large 
SCRs when they acted against the prescription of the Ideal Actor (outer bars, Figure 13). 
Put another way, SCRs may not be so directly tied to the relative advantage of the chosen 
option, but rather index the reflective choice controller’s degree of accordance with 
chosen action—with SCRs magnitudes providing an index of this system’s level of 
discord with the current action.  
Such an explanation, speculative as it is, could fill a potential lacuna in the 
neuroscientific literature. It is well documented that patients with lesions to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) fail to develop anticipatory SCRs when they 
make actions that carry potentially large monetary losses in the Iowa Gambling Task 
(Bechara et al., 1996; 1999; Bechara & Damasio, 2005), and moreover their behavior 
appears largely insensitive to the disadvantageousness of these actions. Putting aside 
Damasio and colleagues’ (1994) explanation for these SCRs, there has been no 
computational model offered for the source of these SCRs but the findings strongly 
implicate vmPFC in the generation of these autonomic signals. Likewise neuroimaging 
work has highlighted the role of the vmPFC in sophisticated value computations in order 
to calculate the relative value of the chosen action (Boorman, Behrens, Woolrich, & 
Rushworth, 2009; Glascher, Hampton, & O’Doherty, 2009; Hampton, Bossaerts, & 
O’Doherty, 2006). Indeed the computations ascribed to the vmPFC in this work are 
evocative of the reflective or model-based choice system discussed here in that they make 
optimal use of the full environment structure in their value calculations rather than simply 
calculating action values in a reflexive manner.  The idea, then, is that present results 
implicate a sophisticated model-based valuation system—presumably underpinned by the 
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vmPFC—in the generation of the autonomic signals that index suboptimal choices. That 
is, such a model-based valuation system could be responsible for the autonomic 
responses observed here when its choice precriptions are violated. Clearly much future 
work is needed to evaluate the plausibility of this hypothesis, especially in the absence of 
neuroscientific data in the present work capable of resolving questions about the 
involvement of brain structures.  
One might wonder why, given the results of Experiment 2 (which demonstrated 
that SCRs reflect the computations of a sophisticated and reflective choice system) and 
Experiment 3 (which demonstrated that concurrent WM load causes decision-makers to 
resort to a naïve and reflexive choice strategy), we did not additionally attempt to 
manipulate cognitive load at the same time we measured anticipatory SCRs. Indeed, we 
performed such an examination in a pilot study, the results of which are not reported 
here. In summary, we did not find any significant qualitative difference in behavior 
across Single- and Dual-Task participants (as evidenced by hazard rates of exploration) 
and we did not find any physiological differentiation between trial types among Dual-
Task participants (be they coarse trial types defined by exploration/exploitation or trial 
types classified on the basis of the Ideal Actor’s prescription). There are intuitive 
explanations for both of these results. First, I speculate that the lack of behavioral effect, 
while potentially troubling if interpreted as a replication of Experiment 3, is due to the 
altered timing of the choice paradigm necessitated by SCR measurements. More 
specifically, the long intertrial intervals allow for increased time to plan between choices 
that would allow Dual-task participants to effectually compensate for their deficits in 
planning during, say the response or feedback phases of the trials. Second, the demanding 
nature of the concurrent task used here—and potentially any concurrent task—likely 
generates its own physiological arousal, which would be manifested in both phasic and 
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tonic SCR components. Indeed, previous work that has sought to investigate behavior and 
anticipatory SCRs in the Iowa Gambling Task found that a concurrent digit-counting task 
saturated the SCR signals effectively masking any decision-related signals of interest 
(Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002). Thus while immediately compelling, combining 
concurrent load and SCR methodologies is challenging and potentially intractable in the 
leapfrog choice paradigm. 
This dissertation laid out a task and modeling framework which elucidates a more 
nuanced and principled form of human exploratory choice, which we found initial 
evidence for in our earlier work (Otto, Markman, Gureckis, & Love, 2010). In doing so 
we found that people exhibit a belief-directed and reflective form of choice behavior, 
which suggests they are using more than just direct observations of choice outcomes. The 
present work enriches the literature on exploratory choice, which has typically 
characterized exploratory behavior as mere stochasticity or randomness in decision rules 
(Daw et al., 2006; Jepma & Niewenhuis, 2011; Worthy et al., 2007).  Further, we found 
compelling evidence for psychometric and physiological correlates of variables 
elucidated by our model-based analysis, providing converging that decision-makers are 
indeed performing some form of reflective calculation of choice values. Further, this 
work is the first use of model-based analyses of SCR to reveal how more abstract and 
inferred quantities play into behavior. This dissertation also presents the first 
investigation of the cognitive costs of exploratory choice, revealing how concurrent 
demands placed on the decision-maker reduce the influence of this more reflective form 
of exploratory choice behavior. Together, these results provide a richer characterization 
of exploratory choice behavior and highlight how choice-related autonomic signals can 
be elucidated through the use of cognitive models. 
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